Convergence and Inequality of income: the case of Western Balkan countries

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Abstract

This paper analyses the convergence process of inequality in income among five Balkan countries in the 1989-2008 period. This study is carried out in comparison with the situation in the European Union of 27 countries. The originality of our approach is to consider the convergence of countries’ contributions to the international income inequality. The model allows simultaneously to test the convergence process of income and inequality. The results indicate a real convergence process between Balkan countries, while persistence is detected between European Union countries. However, the thorough investigations stress that there are differences in the pace of convergence across sub-periods. Thus, income and inequality convergence are higher during the 2000s for the EU-27, while the majority of convergence took place during the second half of the 1990s for Balkan countries. Accordingly, the development gap between Balkans and European Union remains important.

JEL Classification: C23, O40, O52

Keywords: Convergence, Inequality, Panel Data, Balkan countries, European Union

1. Introduction

During the Brussels reunion ‘Union – Western Balkans’ in December 2003, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the European Union (EU) reaffirmed that the future of the five Balkan countries Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia-Montenegro lies in the EU. In order to prepare their accession to the EU, the process of “stabilization and association” constitutes the principal instrument of the European policies with respect to those countries. ⁴ In fact, the European future for Western Balkan countries depends on their ability to carry out reforms in the political, economic and social domains and to fulfill the pre-defined accession criteria. The development of institutions appears as one of the pre-conditions for the accession, to the point where the differences in income levels are attributed by certain studies to the weaknesses and differences in the institutions (see Acemoglu et al., 2001). However, we can wonder whether the integration depends entirely on the success of reforms undertaken by the candidate countries or on the willingness of the EU to set off a timely and successful integration in regards of the country specificities.

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⁴ Croatia submitted its application in June 2004 and started negotiations on accession in October 2005. Macedonia benefited from the ‘candidate country’ status in December 2005. Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are currently negotiating the signing of SAAs (Stabilization and Association Agreements). Finally, Albania signed the SAA in February 2006.
Indeed, Europe encompasses very different and heterogeneous areas (by its territories, ethnic groups, demographics, etc.), with important gaps in development. Real convergence, which would allow for a reduction of economic inequalities between countries, remains a crucial question. This is an issue not only for the present EU members, but also for the Union’s enlargement eastwards. The enlargement process seems thus closely related to the concept of convergence. Consequently, testing the existence of real convergence may represent a significant contribution to the economic analysis of growth. It can also have important implications not only for national policies, but also for the European actions mainly channeled by cohesion and structural funds.

The majority of studies focusing on Europe show a very low income convergence process (see among others Dowrick and Nguyen, 1989; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992; Mankiw et al., 1992; Temple, 1999). Thus, the objective of reducing disparities in Europe seems inaccessible. The relative permanence of inequalities questions the efficiency of European policies and the capacity of the European integration to ensure a real convergence between the EU countries. The principal contribution of this study consists in analyzing the present economic situation of the Balkan countries. In particular, we wish to check the existence of a real convergence process characterizing the Western Balkans. Such a study is important within the context of discussions on the future eastwards enlargement of the Union.

In this paper, we focus our analysis especially on the importance of income inequality (in GDP per capita) between the Balkan countries during the 1989-2008 period. The comparisons with the situation of EU-27 are also examined. The Theil measure (Theil, 1967) is used as an inequality indicator. It is defined as a sum of contributions of each country to the global inequality. We develop and estimate a simple model to test real convergence. The originality of our approach is based on modeling the contributions of countries to the global income inequalities. Thus, we highlight the relationship which may exist between income convergence (expressed by the notion of $\beta$-convergence) and inequality convergence.

Our results show evidence of real convergence between Balkan countries. The estimate speeds of income and inequality convergence are respectively at 2.6% and 2.4%. By contrast, a weaker process characterizes the 27 EU countries. Nevertheless, a thorough investigation points out that there are differences in the patterns of convergence across sub-periods. Thus, income and inequality convergence are higher during the 2000s for the EU-27, while the majority of convergence took place during the second half of the 1990s for Balkan countries. Accordingly, the development gap between the Balkan countries and the EU remains very important and it has been widening considerably over the past years. Indeed, the Balkans’ GDP per capita declined from 40% of the EU-27 level in 1989 to 30% in 2008. The GDP per capita inequalities between Union and Balkan countries increased at a 2% average annual rate during the 1989-2008 period.

The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a brief overview of the literature on convergence. Section 3 is devoted to the methodology, the economic indicators and to modeling inequality convergence. Section 4 discusses the data and presents a descriptive analysis. Section 5 discusses the results of the estimation of the

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5 The goal of economic and social cohesion aimed at reduction of disparities between the member countries is included in the Treaty of Maastricht.
inequality convergence model. The last section concludes the study and underlines the possible directions for future research.

2. An overview of the literature on convergence

Real convergence means rapprochement of levels of economic welfare between countries. The most widely used indicator is real GDP per capita. The question of convergence remains at the center of economic growth theory, where different analyses rest upon a global production function. We can distinguish between two approaches in the literature: the neo-classical model and the endogenous growth one (see for a review Temple, 1999; Durlauf and Quah, 1999; Islam, 2003). These two approaches lead to different conclusions on the convergence process.

The studies on convergence are widely based on the neo-classical theory of economic growth. In its initial formulation, all countries converge toward the same level of economic development; the agents have the same preferences and benefit from the same access to the technology, assumed to be identical for all countries. Technical change is exogenous and the random variations in initial technology are captured by an error term (Mankiw et al., 1992). Some extensions move from cross-section analysis to a panel data approach in order to relax the assumption of identical technologies and to take into account the technological differences (Islam, 1995), although these differences are assumed to be stationary. One of the strong assumptions of the neo-classical approach resides in the immediate diffusion of knowledge. Consequently, a country’s opening will accelerate the process of convergence. Indeed, in the neo-classical model capital accumulation propels and drives growth. The mechanism behind this convergence is based on diminishing returns to capital. The countries with low capital stock and low income per capita will benefit from a better marginal productivity and a higher return to capital. This implies an increased accumulation of capital and a faster growth of poor countries as compared to rich ones. Thus, the models of neo-classical inspiration foresee a tendency to income convergence.6

On the contrary, the endogenous growth models do not assume that income convergence between poor and rich countries is a plausible result. They consider the possibility of different growth paths (see Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Temple 1999). Returns to capital should not be diminishing (see Romer, 1986), and the impact of economic integration on convergence is ambiguous.7 Thus, the approach proposed by Lucas (1988), in which human capital is the principal driving force of growth, shows that the exodus of competencies will act as a vehicle of divergence between countries. Additionally, R&D efforts are considered as the engine of growth and an explanatory factor for technological and economical permanent gaps between countries. This theory thus assumes that the national accumulation of knowledge and technology is endogenous.

In the neo-classical model, policy has no impact on long-term growth rate since the poor countries grow faster than the rich ones. In contrast, in endogenous growth models, convergence is not certain and efficient policies can affect long-term growth by fostering technological innovation. Moreover, others versions of the endogenous model give an important place to the effects of knowledge spillovers (see Coe and Helpman,

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6 Moreover, trade and international mobility of factors will act as mechanisms of income convergence, see Martin and Sanz (2003), Kutan and Yigit (2007).

7 See Kutan and Yigit (2007) on this subject.
1995). Then, through the technological diffusion, the convergence becomes a possible result. Furthermore, foreign direct investments and international trade are considered as channels for technological externalities in the process of convergence (Coe and Helpman, 1995).

The notion of $\beta$-convergence constitutes a link between the study of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) on the convergence of economies and the neo-classical model of growth (Dunford, 1995; Bernard and Durlauf, 1995, 1996). According to this notion, convergence appears when the low-income economies grow faster than the high-income ones, which means that the poor countries tend to catch up the income level of rich countries (see Sala-i-Martin, 1994, 1996). Convergence in the $\beta$ sense may be absolute or conditional to control variables such as the investment rate, technological change, human capital, industrial structure, stability policies, etc. The first concept implies that all countries converge toward the same equilibrium, while the second refers to a convergence toward different steady-states. De La Fuente (1997) presents a review of empirical literature on conditional convergence. The results obtained by the majority of studies show that the countries which invest most in physical and human capital, and which have a low rate of population growth tend to grow faster (see Dowrick and Nguyen, 1989; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992).

Contrary to the traditional approach, this method does not allow for distinguishing different phases of convergence and divergence characterizing the study period. The most rigorous criticism of the notion of $\beta$-convergence comes from the analysis of Quah (1993, 1996), who shows that it is compatible with both the increase and the decrease of inequalities. The latter is expressed by the notion of $\sigma$-convergence. The hypothesis of $\sigma$-convergence implies that income dispersion decreases within a sample of countries, while the concept of $\beta$-convergence underlines the mobility of income. In this way, $\sigma$-convergence implies $\beta$-convergence. The reciprocal is not always verified, $\beta$-convergence and $\sigma$-divergence might coexist.

In summary, convergence is a necessary condition for the economic and monetary integration process. With successive enlargements, convergence is delayed in its implementation. In fact, enlargement is accompanied by an important decrease of the average GDP per capita and an increase of disparities. Thus, the persistence of inequalities compromises the European integration process (beneficial for countries endowed with growth factors) and slows down the convergence. In the following sections, we highlight the theoretical basis of interactions between income and inequality convergence and we examine the empirical applications to Balkan and EU-27 countries.

3. Methodology

3.1. Inequality indicators

Several indicators can be used to measure inequalities (see Cowell, 1995; Cowell and Jenkins, 1995). The Theil's measure is a commonly used indicator (Theil, 1967), as it presents the advantage of being additive and decomposable (Shorrocks, 1984). Let $y_{it}$ be the GDP per capita of country $i$ ($i = 1, \ldots, n$) at time $t$ ($t = 1, \ldots, T$). We can define the Theil indicator as the sum of the contributions of each country to global income.
inequality. In particular, let $d_i$ be the share of country $i$ in a total of $y_i$, the contribution of each country to global inequality is defined by the following expression:

$$
TC_t = d_i \ln(d_i n), \quad d_i = \frac{y_i}{ny'} \quad \text{and} \quad y' = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} y_i,
$$

(1)

where $\ln$ is natural-logarithm. The Theil indicator is the sum of contributions of different countries to global inequalities:

$$
Th_t = \sum_{i=1}^{n} TC_t, \quad Th_t \in [0; \ln(n)].
$$

(2)

In a comparative study including several groups of countries, the decomposition property of the Theil indicator allows for the distinction ‘between-groups’ ($Th_B$) and ‘within-groups’ ($Th_w$) inequalities. The indicator of between-groups inequality is defined as the sum of contributions of each group to global inequality:

$$
Th_B = \sum_{j=1}^{m} BC_j, \quad j = 1, \ldots, m,
$$

(3)

where $BC_j = d_j \ln(d_j n/n_j)$ is the contribution of group $j$, $n_j$ is the number of countries in the group $j$, $n = n_1 + \cdots + n_m$. The component ‘within-groups’ can be deduced from the difference between $Th_t$ and $Th_B$.

In our case, the decomposition of the Theil indicator into ‘between’ and ‘within’ components allows us to assess the importance of inequality between EU-27 and Balkan countries. This may have important implications for national and European policies. The predominance of inequalities ‘within’ should encourage the European authorities to conduct policies aimed at reducing inequalities between the countries of the Union. It acts in the case of the Balkans to coordinate their reform efforts for a successful integration. On the contrary, in the case of predominance of ‘between’ inequality, more global actions toward all Balkan countries might be more appropriate to reduce the development gap between EU and Balkans.

### 3.2. A simple test of inequality convergence

The Theil indicator $Th_t$ captures the levels of global inequality at any time $t$. However, these levels can hide important processes of convergence/divergence between countries. The movements of contributions $TC_t$ reflect these different processes. A real convergence is a situation characterized by a decrease of contributions of rich countries (initially positive) and an increase of poor countries contributions (initially negative). A theoretical equilibrium situation will be characterized by a stationary state in which the contributions are null and the indicator of Theil $Th_t$ tends toward 0.

In order to test the process of convergence/divergence of contributions to inequality between countries, we consider the theoretical framework on the convergence
of economies (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). Our extensions aim to establish a link between the income convergence (captured by $\beta$-convergence) and the contributions to inequality convergence. In particular, we start with the equation of the income convergence in its 'minimal' version (De la Fuente, 1997) defined relatively to the average level:

$$\ln(y_i / y^*_*) = \beta \ln(y_{i-1} / y^*_{i-1}) + v_{it},$$

(4)

where $y_i$ and $y^*_*$ denote the GDP per capita of country $i$ and its average level at time $t$, respectively. $v_{it}$ is an error term. The condition $\beta < 1$ implies a convergence of countries toward the same steady-state. Equation (4) yields a simple test of the absolute convergence. The advantage of this specification is that it permits, on the one hand, to estimate $\beta$ without controlling variables determining the equilibrium state. In fact, the difference between the (log) income levels and its average level allows the elimination of the factors assumed constant over time, but also the specific temporal effects. On the other hand, we can link it with our notion of inequality convergence. In particular, by incorporating equation (4) into (1), we can define the contribution to inequalities of a country under the following form:

$$TC_{it} = \frac{y_i - y^*}{ny^*_*} \ln \left( \frac{y_i}{y^*_*} \right) = \frac{y_i}{ny^*_*} \left[ \beta \ln \left( \frac{y_{i-1}}{y^*_{i-1}} \right) \right] + u_{it},$$

(5)

where $u_{it}$ is the new error term ($u_{it} = d_{it}v_{it}$). The last equation may be rewritten by showing the level of contributions to inequalities at time $(t-1)$:

$$TC_{it} = \beta x_{it} TC_{i-1} = \alpha_{it} TC_{i-1} + u_{it},$$

(6)

where $x_{it} = \frac{y_i / y^*}{y_{i-1} / y^*_{i-1}}$ and $\alpha_{it} = \beta x_{it}$. Equation (6) represents a specification of the convergence of contributions to inequalities, where the parameter of convergence $\alpha_{it}$ is variable. It depends on the income convergence parameter $\beta$ and on the relative income growth index $x_{it}$. The latter is a function of the income growth rate of country $i$ at time $t$, denoted $a_{it}$, and of the average income growth rate, denoted $b_i$:

$$x_{it} = \frac{(1 + a_{it})}{(1 + b_i)}.$$

Equation (6) has important implications for the process of real convergence. Indeed, a real convergence characterized by a decrease of international inequalities

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8 Ravallion (2003) had adopted a similar approach inspired by the test of convergence of inequalities developed by Bénabou (1996). However, the author considers the inequalities within-countries by observing the variation in time of the indicator of Gini. On the contrary, in this work we analyze the inequalities between-countries by observing the variation of contributions to inequalities instead of the indicator of Theil, by analogy to Gini index.

9 For example, we may refer to Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) or to Islam (1995) for the analytical developments to derive the convergence equation starting from the production function.
assumes that on average $\alpha < 1$. This condition implies that $x < 1/\beta$. Three possible situations may be considered:

i. Inequality convergence: income convergence ($\beta < 1$) implies that the poor countries have a higher growth rate than the rich ones. It follows that the individual average growth rate $\alpha$ is greater than the average income growth rate $b$, so we expect that $x > 1$. That results in $\alpha > \beta$ and $\alpha < x$. In this way, a process of convergence of contributions to inequalities will be characterized by a situation where $\beta < \alpha < 1$.

ii. Persistence of inequality: if on average the rich and the poor countries have the same growth rates ($b \equiv b$ and $x \equiv 1$), the weak income convergence process among countries does not entail any change in the structure of contributions. Consequently, $\alpha \equiv \beta$ and the two parameters will tend toward 1.

iii. Divergence: the divergence process ($\beta > 1$) implies that the mean of individual growth rates is lower than the average income growth rate, $x < b$. This is the consequence of a higher growth of rich countries. The result is that $\alpha < \beta$ and $\alpha > x$. Nevertheless, the process of convergence of contributions to inequalities is not ensured as the high growth of rich countries will drive a rise in their contributions. Correlatively the contributions of the poor countries drop. In consequence, we can expect that $\alpha > 1$.

### 3.3. Taking heterogeneity into account

The specification of inequality convergence (6) rests upon a hypothesis of the absolute convergence model (4) according to which countries are approaching the same equilibrium level. The concept of conditional convergence supposes the control of factors which differentiate countries. We can consider two approaches. The first consists in introducing explanatory variables in the equation of income convergence (4). However, at the international level, the choice of explanatory variables is severely limited by the availability of data for all countries and over the entire period of study. Furthermore, the determinants of inequalities represent another crucial issue (see Barro, 2000). The majority of studies on these determinants consider variants of the Kuznets curve. However, Li et al., (1998) conclude that the Kuznets curve remains satisfactory in a cross-section approach compared to time series study.

The second approach stems from the criticism of specifications (4) and (6) which assume that the countries approach the steady-state at the same speed. Yet, from a theoretical point of view (see Mankiw et al., 1992; Islam, 1995), the parameter of convergence $\beta$ is a function of several factors. In fact, it depends on the return to scale coefficient, the capital depreciation rate, the technical progress rate and population growth. The return to scale parameter may itself be composed of the capital coefficient in the production function and a coefficient which captures the spillover effects (or human capital). The hypothesis according to which the economies’ behavior is homogeneous (the same value of $\beta$ for all countries) supposes that the aforesaid factors are constant over time or are assumed to be the same for all countries.

In practice, the heterogeneity of behavior may be taken into account by adding specific individual and/or temporal effects in equation (6). Even if the econometric
practice shows that this approach remains sufficient, it may, however, prove to be inadequate in several situations. So, the idea is to introduce heterogeneity at the convergence parameter which becomes variable across countries $\beta_i$. Consequently, two situations may be analyzed, whether the heterogeneity is assumed fixed or random (see Hsiao, 1986). In the first situation, we can estimate the model for each individual (if the temporal dimension allows to do it) or make $\beta_i$ dependent of other country-specific variables. In the second situation, $\beta_i$ is assumed to be random and may be specified as $\beta_i = \beta + \xi_i$, where $\beta$ is an average level and $\xi_i$ is a random variable expressing the national specificities. As our objective in this study is to examine the interactions between income and inequality convergence, we will limit ourselves to this second approach.

4. Data and empirical indicators

Our empirical investigations examine the evolution of GDP per capita over the period 1989-2008 of five Balkan countries. We shall also endeavor to show the situation of the Balkans compared to EU-27. Data used are extracted from the statistical database GGDC (Groningen Growth and Development Centre). The series of GDP are expressed in PPPs (Purchasing Power Parities) in US dollars with constant prices 1990. The use of data in PPPs is more adapted for international comparisons and for studies on growth and convergence of economies (see Maddison, 2001, 2005).

4.1. Economic indicators

Table 1 presents the economic indicators for the five Balkan countries. We note that the disparities between countries are fairly visible. In 1989, 112 points in percent separated the income per capita level then the highest in Croatia (162%) from the lowest in Albania (50%). In 2008, the gap was 100 in percent between Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro. We can also observe that only Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia presented GDP per capita levels largely superior to the average of Balkan countries in 2008.

The per capita GDP dynamics can be understood by examining the relative growth index. For all Balkan countries, average income grew at the annual rate of 1.1%. This is lower than the average rate of individual growth, which is at 1.39%. The relative growth index is therefore at 1.003 (1.0139/1.011 ≅ 1.003), that is a 0.3% per year increase in the 1989-2008 period. However, if we analyze the situation of different countries, we find unequal income growth rates. In fact, with 4.7% increase in GDP per capita, Bosnia-Herzegovina catches up its delay compared to Croatia: 79 points separated the two countries in 1989, while the gap was only 30 points in 2008. Thus, Bosnia-Herzegovina presents the highest relative growth index in the observed period. Albania ranks second in terms of income growth (3.2% on average) and relative growth

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10 We may also consider that the parameter of convergence varies in time. This hypothesis remains interesting in an analysis where the temporal dimension is sufficiently large to apprehend correctly the possible structural changes.

11 A large discussion on the economic data of the five Balkan countries can be found in El ouardighi and Somun (2007). The authors use three economic indicators of income, productivity and employment to assess the performance of Balkan countries during the 1989-2005 period. Their results show considerable differences between countries.

index (1.023 on average). In contrast, the lowest decrease in GDP per capita was observed in Serbia-Montenegro (-1.6% on average) and, to a lesser extent, in Macedonia (-0.3% on average).

Table 1: GDP per capita of Balkan countries, 1989-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1989</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>Average growth rate in %</th>
<th>Relative growth index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>1.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>0.990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia and Montenegro</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
<td>0.971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All countries</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td><strong>1.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.003</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: GDP per capita in PPPs (Purchasing Power Parities) 1990 US$.
Source: Calculation by the authors according to GGDC Database.

If we look at the situation of Balkan countries relative to the EU-27 (Table 2), the average GDP per capita level remains lower than 50% of the EU level. The relative GDP per capita decreased by 1.2% per year over the 1989-2008 period. Hence, the average level declined from 40% to 30%. In 2008, with 48% and 40% of the EU-27 level respectively, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are at the bottom of the list of EU-27 countries. In particular, GDP per capita of Croatia is in 2008 at the level of Bulgaria, while that of Bosnia-Herzegovina is located between Romania (26%) and Bulgaria (48%).

Table 2: GDP per capita of Balkan countries, ratios to the EU-27 level, 1989-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1989</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>Average growth rate in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>-1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>-2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia and Montenegro</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>-3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All countries</strong></td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30</td>
<td><strong>-1.2</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: GDP per capita in PPPs (Purchasing Power Parities) 1990 US$.
Source: Calculation by the authors according to GGDC Database.
Table 3 presents a synthesis of GDP per capita growth indicators for Balkan and EU-27 countries. The average individual growth rate of income is at 2.31% per year for EU-27 and remains close to average income growth rate (2.25% per year). That results in a relative growth index almost equal to 1 (1.001). With growth levels less important for the Balkans, relative growth index is slightly greater than 1 (1.003). These results already give us an indication of real convergence. In fact, as we have seen in the previous section, a relative growth index close to 1 is an indicator of persistence (the EU-27 case). A value of index higher than 1 suggests a real convergence of GDP per capita (Balkan countries case).

Table 3: Indicators of GDP per capita growth, 1989-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EU-27</th>
<th>Balkans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual growth (average rate in %) – $a_*$</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>1.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global growth (average rate in %) – $b_*$</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative growth index – $x_*$</td>
<td>1.001</td>
<td>1.003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: GDP per capita in PPPs (Purchasing Power Parities) 1990 US$.
Source: Calculation by the authors according to GGDC Database

4.2. Inequality indicators

If we examine the evolution of GDP per capita inequality among Balkan countries (see Table 4 and Figure 1), we see a slight upward tendency, an average increase of 0.6% per year. In the 1989-2008 period, the Theil index had gone from 0.068 to 0.076. However, we note significant movement in the country contributions to international inequality. On the one hand, Bosnia-Herzegovina distinguishes itself clearly with a strong increase of its contribution, an average increase of 6.7% per year. Consequently, the initial negative contribution of this country (-0.031) is now positive (0.074). Albania ranks second with an increase of its contribution at 5.1% on average; however, its contribution remains negative. On the other hand, the strongest decrease was recorded in Serbia-Montenegro (-5.5% on average) and to a lesser extent in Macedonia (-1.9% on average). Finally, the contribution to inequality of Croatia remained fairly stable, suggesting a slight increase of 0.2% on average in the 1989-2008 period.

In comparison to the Balkan countries, the inequalities among the EU-27 countries have increased by 0.2% on average. However, we observe a slight downward tendency, started in 1994 (see Figure 1). From the perspective of the EU enlarged to the five Balkan countries, we find that inequality levels are more considerable (see the bottom of Table 4 and Figure 1). The Theil indices are at 0.109 in 1989 and 0.129 in
2008, indicating an increase of 0.9% per year. Inequalities within are largely predominant with shares over 59%. However, we notice that the component between has increased the most, i.e., 2% on average. Hence, the share of Between-inequality has gone from 33% in 1989 to 41% in 2008.

Figure 1: Income Inequality, 1989-2008

![Graph showing income inequality from 1989 to 2008.](image)

Table 4: Income Inequality Indicators of Balkan countries, 1989-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Inequality contribution of GDP per capita</th>
<th>Average growth rate in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>-0.069</td>
<td>-0.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
<td>0.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>0.155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>-0.019</td>
<td>-0.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia and Montenegro</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>-0.059</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theil index</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balkans</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-27</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>0.076</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decomposition of total Theil index (EU-27 and Balkans)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inequality Between (share in %)</td>
<td>0.036 (33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inequality Within (share in %)</td>
<td>0.073 (67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theil Total</td>
<td>0.109</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: GDP per capita in PPPs (Purchasing Power Parities) 1990 US$.
Source: Calculation by the authors according to GGDC Database.

Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it
5. Estimation results for the inequality convergence model

5.1. Estimation method

The equation (6) of inequality convergence can be re-written as follows:

\[ TC_{it} = \beta Z_{it} + u_{it}, \]  

(7)

where \( Z_{it} = x_{it}TC_{it-1} \) and \( x_{it} \) is the relative growth index. The error term \( u_{it} \) is composed of a country-specific effect \( \mu_i \) and of an independently identically distributed random term \( \varepsilon_{it} \), with mean zero and variance \( \sigma^2 \). Under this form, the country heterogeneity is taken into account through adjunction of the country-specific effect. The equation does not contain any constant term because theoretically, in the long term, the equilibrium is characterized by a stationary state where contributions are at zero.

The estimation method should take into account the possible endogeneity occurring through the explanatory variable \( Z_{it} \) in order to provide estimators with best properties. If \( Z_{it} \) is correlated with the country-specific effect \( \mu_i \), the within estimator is obtained by applying OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) to the specification in terms of deviation from the country means. In this case, the effects are treated as fixed. In contrast, if the effects \( \mu_i \) are treated as random and not correlated with the explanatory variables, the GLS (Generalized Least Squares) estimator is the most efficient linear estimator (see Baltagi, 2001). The Hausman statistics, based on difference between two estimators allows us to test the hypothesis of independence among the effects and the explanatory variables of the model (see Hausman, 1978). However, due to the presence of endogenous lagged variables, within and GLS methods do not lead to efficient estimates as long as the dimension (individual or temporal) is finite. One of the solutions is to use the IV (Instrumental Variables) method. In particular, in presence of country-specific effects, it is possible to obtain more efficient estimators (see Sevestre and Trognon, 1995, pp.133-136) using the GIV (Generalized Instrumental Variables) method. At first, the procedure consists of deducting an estimation of variances \( \sigma^2_{\mu} \) and \( \sigma^2_{\varepsilon} \). Second, we apply OLS on the transformed data \( TC_{it} - \hat{\phi} TC_{it-1} \) and \( Z_{it} - \hat{\phi} Z_{it-1} \), with \( \hat{\phi} = 1 - \sqrt{\hat{\theta}^2} \) and \( \hat{\theta}^2 = \hat{\sigma}^2_{\varepsilon} [\hat{\sigma}^2_{\mu} + T\hat{\sigma}^2_{\mu}]^{-1} \) and using \( Z_{it-1} \) as instrument (or its transformation in the same way, \( Z_{it-1} - \hat{\phi} Z_{it-1} \)).

For the variable coefficient model, the specification for estimation is as follows:

\[ TC_{it} = \beta_i Z_{it} + u_{it}. \]  

(8)

The previous estimators (within, GLS and GIV) are not consistent (see Pesaran and Smith, 1995; Pesaran et al., 1995). If we suppose that the countries’ behaviors are fixed, Pesaran et al., (1995) show that the simple arithmetic mean of individual estimations provides a consistent estimator of \( \beta_i \) if \( N \) and \( T \) tend toward the infinity. However, because individual estimations risk being implausible when the temporal dimension is low, we can rely on the Stein-rule shrinkage estimator regarded as more
robust (see Maddala and Hu, 1995). The estimator is defined as a weighted average of individual estimators and of the estimation obtained from the pooled regression. The weights depend on a term expressing the degrees of freedom and the Fisher statistic for testing the homogeneity of behaviors, i.e. the null hypothesis of the equality of $\beta_i$ (see Judge and Bock, 1978, pp. 190-195). When $\beta_i$ are treated as random, $\beta_i = \beta + \xi_i$, where $\xi_i$ is an error term which captures country specificities. The estimator of $\beta$ is a GLS estimator defined as a weighted average of individual estimators (see Hsiao, 1986, pp. 130-134). As $\beta_i$ is random, only $\beta$ and $\sigma_{\xi}^2$ are estimated. However, we can derive a prediction for the individual parameters $\beta_i$ based on a procedure developed by Lee and Griffiths (1979).

5.2. Estimation results

Table 5 presents estimation results of the specification (7). Columns (a) and (c) present OLS estimations. Columns (b) and (d) refer to GIV estimators, and our comments will be related to these. Results obtained for the EU-27 countries show a persistence of contributions to international inequality. The parameter of income convergence is close to 1. Convergence speed $\lambda$ computed from the relationship $\lambda = e^{-\beta}$ is almost zero (0.2%). As the relative growth index for EU-27 is close to 1 ($1 \approx 1$), the parameter of convergence of contributions to inequality is $\hat{\alpha} \approx \hat{\beta} \approx 1$. In contrast, the results for Balkan countries show evidence for income and inequality convergence. Estimated speeds are at 2.6% for income convergence and 2.4% for contributions convergence to inequality. Thus, these results confirm a process of real convergence among Balkan countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable $TC_{it}$</th>
<th>EU-27</th>
<th>Balkan countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\hat{\beta}$ -convergence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speed of convergence in %</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\hat{\alpha}$ - convergence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speed of inequality convergence in %</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Estimation results of inequality convergence model, 1989-2008

Notes: (a) and (c) OLS (Ordinary least squares) estimations. (b) and (d) GIV (Generalized Instrumental variables) estimations. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. (***), (**) and (*) imply rejection of the null hypothesis that the coefficient of convergence is equal to 1 (i.e., the speed of convergence is statistically null) at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
As \( \hat{a}_n = \hat{\beta} x_n \), we can observe the evolution of convergence speed of contributions to inequality, subject to evolution of the relative growth index (see Figure 2). We therefore notice that the convergence speed of contributions to income inequality \(-\ln(\hat{a}_n)\) tends toward the level of income convergence speed \(-\ln(\hat{\beta})\). Indeed, in the long term, the stationary state represents a situation where the growth rate of average individual income, \( a_{LT} \), is equivalent to the growth rate of average income, \( b_{LT} \). It then follows that the relative growth index will tend toward 1 \( (x_{LT} \rightarrow 1) \). Thus, in the stationary state, the two convergence speeds will coincide, i.e., \( a_{LT} \rightarrow \beta \). Figure 2 shows that the speed of convergence of contributions to inequalities in the Balkans tends toward 2.6% while that in EU-27 tends toward the level of 0.0%.

![Figure 2: Speed of Inequality Convergence, 1989-2008](image)

Table 6 presents the estimation results for the specification (8) under the hypothesis of heterogeneity of \( \beta \). In comparison to previous results, we find that the convergence speed is now slightly higher for EU-27: 0.9%-1.5% for income convergence speed and 0.9%-1.4% for income inequality convergence speed. In the case of Balkan countries, the speed is now slightly lower: a speed of 1.6% for income convergence and of 1.5% for inequality convergence. These results may suggest heterogeneity of behavior, more visible in the EU-27 than in Balkan countries. However, test results under the hypothesis of homogeneity lead to accept the hypothesis of homogenous behavior. Chi-square statistics (see Hsiao, 1986) are at 26.8 for EU-27 and 1.44 for Balkan countries. At the 10% level of significance, these statistics are lower than the theoretical values 35.65 and 7.78, respectively. In conclusion, we cannot reject the hypothesis of homogeneity during the 1989-2008 period.
Table 6: Estimation Results of variable coefficient model, 1989-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimation</th>
<th>$\beta_{-}$-convergence</th>
<th>$\alpha_{-}$- convergence</th>
<th>Homogeneity-test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Random-Coef.</td>
<td>Stein</td>
<td>Random-Coef.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-27</td>
<td>0.991*</td>
<td>0.986**</td>
<td>0.992*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speed in %</td>
<td>0.901</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>0.901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkan</td>
<td>0.984</td>
<td>0.984</td>
<td>0.985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>countries</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speed in %</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: (a) Homogeneity-test: at 10% significance level, chi-square critical values are 35.65 with 26 degrees of freedom for EU-27, and 7.78 with 4 degrees of freedom for Balkan countries. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. (***) (***) and (*) imply rejection of the null hypothesis that the coefficient of convergence is equal to 1 (i.e., the speed of convergence is statistically null) at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.

To shed more light on the process of convergence during the 1989-2008 period, we have examined the situation in two shorter post-intervals 1996-2008 and 2000-2008. The post-1995 period was characterized by a return to economic and political stability in Balkan countries, while the post-1999 period experienced high growth process in Europe. Table 7 reports the estimates of speeds of income and inequality convergence. The results stress that there are differences in the patterns of convergence across sub-periods. Moreover, the heterogeneity of behaviors is especially noticeable in the case of the EU-27 as shown by the Chi-square statistics of the homogeneity-test (see Table 7). Thus, income and inequality convergence are more important during the 2000s for the EU-27: a speed of 2.4%-2.7% for income convergence and of 2.1%-2.5% for inequality convergence during the 2000-2008 period. In contrast, the majority of convergence took place during the second half of the 1990s for Balkan countries: the speeds of income and inequality convergence are 5.7% and 5.6% respectively. Whereas, we observe a slow pace of convergence as of the beginning of the 2000s. Indeed, the speeds of income and inequality convergence are at 0.4% and 0.3% respectively in the 2000-2008 period. These results are as many evidence of the persistence and the widening of the development gap between the EU-27 and Balkan countries during the 2000s (see Table 2).
Table 7: Estimation results of income and inequality convergence speeds

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Income convergence speed in % (a)</td>
<td>1.5**</td>
<td>1.7***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>1.9*</td>
<td>2.7**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c)</td>
<td>1.4**</td>
<td>2.4***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income inequality convergence speed in % (a)</td>
<td>1.3**</td>
<td>1.5***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>1.7*</td>
<td>2.5**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c)</td>
<td>1.2**</td>
<td>2.1***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homogeneity-test (d)</td>
<td>257***</td>
<td>283***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Balkan countries</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Income convergence speed in % (a)</td>
<td>5.7**</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c)</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income inequality convergence speed in % (a)</td>
<td>5.6**</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c)</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homogeneity-test (d)</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>8.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Estimation: (a) GIV (Generalized Instrumental variables), (b) Random coefficient, (c) Stein. (d) Homogeneity-test: at 10% significance level, chi-square critical values are 35.65 with 26 degrees of freedom for EU-27, and 7.78 with 4 degrees of freedom for Balkan countries. (***) and (*) imply rejection of the null hypothesis that the speed of convergence is statistically null at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.

6. Conclusions

In this study, we have presented a first attempt to model the inequality convergence process of GDP per capita. The originality of our approach is to consider the convergence of country contributions to global inequality as compared to the classical approach of income convergence. In particular, the model allows for catching both the phenomena of income and inequality convergence. Our empirical inquiries were based on five Balkan countries, that we also compared with the EU-27 situation in the 1989-2008 period.

The results show a tendency toward convergence of income and inequality of Balkan countries during the entire period 1989-2008. This statement is less clear-cut if we observe the situation in EU-27 where persistence was detected. However, the results point out the noticeable differences in the patterns of convergence across sub-periods. Moreover, the heterogeneity of behaviors is effective in the case of the EU-27. Thus, income and inequality convergence are higher during the 2000s for the EU-27, while the majority of convergence took place during the second half of the 1990s for Balkan countries.

These findings represent a contribution to convergence studies of economies. Our approach can be placed in the domain of analysis of international inequalities as well as of efficiency of European policies. Indeed, in the framework of European economic integration, one of the European Commission’s objectives is to equalize incomes among different member States. As we underlined at the beginning of this paper, the European convergence process has considerably slowed since the 1980s. However, our results show a sign of recovery during the 2000s in the case of the EU enlarged to 27 countries, but a convergence slowdown in the case of Balkan countries.
Accordingly, although the development of the end of the 1990s has helped reducing the disparities among Balkan countries, the development gap relative to the EU remains significant and has grown deeper in the observed period. Between 1989 and 2008, the relative average income of Balkan countries has dropped from 40% to 30% of the EU level. Consequently, in the perspective of the EU enlargement eastwards, the European policies need to take this reality into account. The EU should support additional actions favorable to the development of the Balkan region, without deepening the disparities among countries. For example, it should put the focus on defining and realising common strategic development objectives of the Balkans. In the context of a faster integration of the Balkan region into EU, the process of economic and institutional reforms, and the promotion of mutual regional cooperation should be coordinated and better harmonised.

With respect to our approach, numerous directions could be considered both at the theoretical and the empirical levels. It could be interesting to study more deeply the relationship which may exist between income and inequality convergence. The causality between the two phenomena is a crucial question: does the strong convergence create more inequality or do significant inequalities represent a handicap to convergence? This question remains at the heart of studies on growth and inequalities (see Bénabou, 1996; Aghion et al., 1999; Barro, 2000; Forbes, 2000). From an empirical perspective, it could be interesting to incorporate determinants of inequalities in the model. Among these, it could be judicious to consider the variables used in the study of conditional convergence. Levine and Renelt (1992) list no less than fifteen variables used in the literature on growth. However, they conclude that the convergence relationship keeps its robustness with investment and initial value of income, while other variables lose their significance (e.g., population growth, monetary and fiscal variables, etc.). Finally, technological heterogeneity did not receive much attention in the empirical literature on economic convergence. This issue is currently regaining importance in the EU.

European policies, through structural funds, have supported the less developed countries with the aim of reducing income disparities. Currently, with the creation of the European Research and Innovation Area (Lisbon Summit in 2000), European policies increasingly support technological and research development.

References


Martin C., Sanz I. (2003), ‘Real convergence and European integration: the experience of the less developed EU members’, *Empirica, 30*, 205-236.


